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BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE USE AND 
POTENTIAL MISUSE OF DNA 
TECHNOLOGY IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Janice D. Villiers* 
Abstract:  DNA technology revolutionized criminal law, family law and 
trust and estates practice.  It is now revolutionizing immigration law. Cur-
rently the Department of Homeland Security does not require DNA tests, 
but it recommends these tests when primary documentation, such as 
marriage licenses, birth certificates and adoption papers are not available 
to prove the relationship between the U.S. citizen petitioner and the 
beneficiary who is seeking permanent resident status in the United States. 
DNA tests are attractive to the government as a result of administrative 
convenience and as a means of countering fraud, but adoption of a 
wholesale policy of DNA testing poses a host of potential problems. In an 
area of law where family reunification is described as the primary goal, an 
increase in the use of DNA sometimes results in separating families and 
other unintended consequences. By promoting the use of DNA evidence, 
the social interests that are paramount in a family relationship could be-
come subservient to genetic interests. The beneficiaries could become 
mere genetic entities, whose biological relationship through their genes is 
paramount. This promotes the view that shared genes are the principal 
means of identifying human relationships and that one should be entitled 
to legal benefits solely on this basis. Quality control in the collection, stor-
age and testing of samples, access of individuals to testing facilities, espe-
cially in developing countries, privacy interests and the potential for mis-
use of the results of these tests, particularly in preventing the admission of 
aliens on health grounds are among the potential problems identified in 
this article. Using examples from disciplines where DNA evidence has 
been adopted—criminal, family and estates and trusts law—this article 
will present a workable policy for the use of this technology in immigra-
tion law. 
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Introduction 
 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) technology has revolutionized crim-
inal law.1 DNA technology has helped to exonerate wrongly convicted 
individuals and solve long unsolved cases.2 Reports in the popular press 
and the success of organizations like the Innocence Project demon-
strate the positive results from the use of DNA evidence in criminal 
cases.3 Partially because of its success in criminal law, DNA evidence is 
now used in other areas of the law including family, trusts and estates, 
and immigration law.4 
 Despite the perceived neutrality of science, immigrants have not 
fared well when the government has employed genetics and other he-
redity based testing to screen potential immigrants from entering the 
country.5 For instance, eugenics—a forerunner of modern genetics— 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Michael Lynch et al., Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA 
Fingerprinting 190–93 (2008). 
2 See id. at 256–63. 
3 Innocence Project, About the Organization: Mission Statement, http://www.inno- 
cenceproject.org/about (follow “Mission” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Innocence Project Mission]. The Innocence Project was founded by Barry Scheck, who 
is best known for his membership in O.J. Simpson’s Dream Team. See Lynch et al., supra 
note 1, at 58; Innocence Project, About the Organization: Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neu-
feld, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about (follow “Staff Directory” hyperlink) (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2010). The goal of this sixteen-year-old organization is to exonerate the 
wrongly convicted through the use of DNA evidence and, more broadly, to reform the 
criminal justice system. See Innocence Project Mission, supra. With the help of the Project’s 
lobbying efforts, forty-three states have passed legislation granting prisoners access to DNA 
testing to prove their innocence. See Innocence Project, Fix the System: Access to DNA 
Testing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix (follow “DNA Testing Access” hyperlink) 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2010). 
4 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 
Vand. L. Rev. 313, 315, 321–27 (1992) (discussing impact of DNA in family and trusts and 
estates law); Memorandum from Michael D. Cronin, Acting Executive Assoc. Comm’r, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Servs., to All Reg’l Dirs., All Dist. Dirs., All 
Officers In Charge, All Serv. Ctr. Dirs., FLETC, & Artesia ( July 14, 2000) (available at 77 
Interpreter Releases 1096, app. ( July 31, 2000)) [hereinafter Cronin Memorandum] 
(discussing DNA and immigration proceedings). Indeed, DNA technology is now so com-
monplace that individuals display replicas of their DNA as artwork and commercial estab-
lishments offer at-home tests. See Andrew Pollack, The Wide, Wild World of Genetic Testing, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2006, at G4 (describing the perils of direct-to-consumer genetic test-
ing); Myriad Genetics, http://www.myriad.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) (offering BRAC 
Analysis, a genetic test for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, Melaris, a genetic test for 
hereditary melanoma, Colaris AP, a genetic test for adenomatous polyposis syndromes, 
Colaris, a genetic test for hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC), and Ther-
aGuide 5-FU, a genetic test to predict toxicity to 5-FU/capecitabine-based chemotherapy). 
5 See Staff Report of the Select Comm’n on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 
ED211613, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest 177−80 (1981) [here-
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was used to discourage the immigration of certain less favored groups 
and played a significant role in immigration policy.6 The early propo-
nents of the eugenics movement were concerned about the genetic 
makeup of immigrants.7 New immigrants were “considered culturally 
different and incapable of this country’s version of self-government, 
not because of their backgrounds but because they were thought to be 
biologically and inherently inferior.”8 They were therefore “disliked 
and feared.”9 Prominent scholars of the day believed that biology pre-
vented these new immigrants from becoming “100 percent Ameri-
can.”10 
 Scientists argued that the improvement of the American stock re-
quired the exclusion of feeble-minded people.11 Some immigration 
authorities allowed scientists to conduct tests on immigrants upon arri-
val in the United States to screen out those immigrants they deemed to 
be “moron[s].”12 In 1924, The National Origin Quota Act, known as 
the Immigration Act of 1924, established a system which restricted im-
                                                                                                                      
inafter Immigration Policy]; James D. Watson & Andrew Berry, DNA: The Secret of 
Life 17−25 (2003). 
6 See Watson & Berry, supra note 5, at 17–23. 
7 See id. at 18 (“[B]y making conscious choices about who should have children, 
eugenics believed they could head off the ‘eugenic crisis.’”). According to Watson, Galton, 
a British citizen, espoused “positive eugenics,” encouraging genetically superior people to 
reproduce. Id. at 18−21. On the other hand, the American focus was on eliminating bad 
genes, based on family studies of “degeneration” and “feeble-mindedness.” Id. at 21. 
8 Immigration Policy, supra note 5, at 178. 
9 Id. 
10 See Dave McCurdy, The Future of U.S. Immigration Law, 20 J. Legis. 3, 5 (1994). 
11 Paul Spickard, Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in 
American History and Identity 271 (2007). Spickard reports that in 1912, H.H. God-
dard, a former schoolteacher and University of Southern California football coach con-
vinced the authorities to allow him and two assistants to test immigrants arriving at Ellis 
Island. Id. 
One assistant would scan the room for people who, to his eyes, looked stupid. 
They were pulled out of line and tested by the second assistant. If the test 
found them to be, in Goddard’s terminology, an “idiot,” an “imbecile,” or a 
“moron,” they were denied entry to the country. Goddard claimed that forty 
percent of steerage passengers were “feeble-minded.” 
Id. A similar test was used for assignment of soldiers in World War I. Id. Carl Brigham, an 
army tester identified ethnic differences and claimed that “Alpine and Mediterranean 
‘races’ —that is, people of central and southern European origin—were ‘intellectually 
inferior to members of the Nordic race.’” Id.; see also Rachel Silber, Note, Eugenics, Family 
and Immigration Law in the 1920s, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 859, 862 (1997) (“Human progres-
sion, eugenicists found, had multiple stages. The highest stage of human progression was 
that of the white race, though scientists disagreed whether Nordic or Teutonic genes were 
the most important.”). 
12 See Spickard, supra note 11, at 271. 
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migration to two percent of the number of foreign-born persons for 
each nationality enumerated in the 1890 census.13 This system, which 
favored some nationalities over others, remained essentially unchanged 
until 1965.14 
 Today, DNA testing is used to “screen” potential immigrants before 
entry into the United States.15 This type of “screening” occurs when a 
United States citizen applies for his foreign-born child to join him in 
the United States as a lawful permanent resident, commonly known as 
a green card holder.16 If the father is unable to provide his child’s birth 
certificate or his petition has some irregularity or missing information, 
the United States Immigration and Citizenship Service (USCIS) may 
suggest DNA testing to prove the paternal relationship.17 Although 
DNA tests are not currently required, they may be considered as secon-
dary documentation when primary documentation such as marriage 
licenses, birth certificates and adoption papers are not available.18 
These tests are promoted as a means of thwarting fraud, but adoption 
of a wholesale policy of DNA testing poses a host of potential prob-
lems.19 
 Using examples from areas of law in which DNA evidence has al-
ready been adopted—criminal law, trusts and estates law, and family 
law—this article proposes a workable policy for the use of this technology 
in immigration cases. Part I discusses immigration law’s goal of family 
reunification. Part II introduces some potential problems that may arise 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68–139, ch. 2, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 
(1924). 
14 See id.; Spickard, supra note 11, at 337–41. 
15 Cronin Memorandum, supra note 4. 
16 See id. at 1. 
17 See Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, to Field 
Leadership 3 (Mar. 19, 2008) (on file with USCIS) [hereinafter Aytes Memorandum]; see 
also Cronin Memorandum, supra note 4 (“Since blood parentage testing can be a valuable 
tool to verify a relationship, it may generally be required when initial and secondary forms 
of evidence have proven insufficient to prove a claimed relationship.”). Michael D. Cronin, 
then “Acting Executive Associate Commissioner of the INS instituted USCIS policy con-
cerning DNA testing in a July 2000 memorandum.” See Aytes Memorandum, supra, at 2. 
The policy allows field offices to “suggest” DNA testing when other forms of evidence as to 
the child’s parentage have proved inconclusive. See id. 
18 See Aytes Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2; Cronin Memorandum, supra note 4. 
The memorandum from Cronin states that while 8 C.F.R. 204.2(d)(2)(vi) allows directors 
“to require Blood Group Antigen or Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood parentage 
tests, there is no similar statutory or regulatory authority allowing them to require DNA 
testing.” Cronin Memorandum, supra note 4. 
19 See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, DNA Tests Offer Immigrants Hope or Despair, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
10, 2007, at A1 (showing adoption of DNA testing in the immigration context poses prob-
lems). 
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if no limits are placed on how DNA evidence is used in immigration pro-
ceedings. Part III describes how DNA testing is used in criminal law, 
trusts and estates law and family law. Part IV then discusses more thor-
oughly potential problems that may arise from the use of DNA evidence 
in immigration proceedings. Part V presents some potential solutions to 
these problems. Finally, the article concludes by arguing that more over-
sight of the DNA testing companies and also policies regarding quality 
assurance and privacy are necessary and that immigration law—like fam-
ily law—should embrace a more expansive concept of paternity. 
I. The Goal of Family Reunification 
The family is the first social unit. All good citizenship and all good govern-
ment rest upon the integrity of the home.20 
 
 In America, the family is fundamental, not only as a social unit, but 
also as the bedrock of the nation.21 Since the passage of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952, one of the guiding principles of 
immigration law has been to reunite families.22 The structure of the 
current statute illustrates this policy.23 
 The statute imposes a priority system related to the closeness of the 
family member to the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.24 Im-
mediate relatives are at the top of this priority system for lawful perma-
nent resident status.25 Immediate relatives are defined by the statute as 
spouses of citizens, children (under twenty-one) of citizens and parents 
                                                                                                                      
20 Silber, supra note 11, at 865 n.32 (quoting Immigration of Relatives of Citizens: Hearing 
on H.R. 5, H.R. 38, H.R. 50, H.R. 190, H.R. 317, H.R. 482, H.R. 3757, H.R. 3941, H.R. 5004, 
H.R. 5042, H.R. 5820, H.R. 6238, H.R. 7089, H.R. 7097, H.R. 7379, H.R. 7474, and H.R. 
7968 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 69th Cong. 101 (1926) (letter 
from Dr. Alfred Williams Anthony, Federal Counsel, Churches of Christ in America, to 
Hon. Albert Johnson, Chair, House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization (Feb. 
1926))). 
21 See id. at 864. 
22 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) 
(emphasizing familial relations). The current INA continues this tradition of unifying 
temporarily divided families by exempting immediate relatives from the family-based quo-
tas. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (defining children and establish-
ing comprehensive family-based preferences). 
23 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
24 See id. § 1153(a). 
25 Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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of citizens over twenty-one.26 The statute does not impose quotas on 
immediate relatives, or “beneficiaries” as they are known.27 Conse-
quently, beneficiaries can join their citizen family members in the 
United States with minimum delay.28 
 After immediate relatives, the family-based preference order is as 
follows. The first preference allows unmarried sons and daughters to be 
sponsored by their United States citizen parents.29 The second prefer-
ence category allows lawful permanent residents to sponsor their 
spouses and unmarried children no matter what age.30 The third pref-
erence permits married children over twenty-one to be sponsored by 
their United States citizen parents.31 Finally, in the least favored group 
are brothers and sisters of United States citizens.32 Literally hundreds of 
thousands of people from this last category are waiting for admission 
into the United States.33 As a result, many wait sometimes ten years or 
more to join their siblings in the United States.34 
II. The Problem of DNA Use in Immigration 
 Before DNA testing became readily available, the USCIS verified 
family relationship by government documents, school records or pho-
tographs or, when these were not available, affidavits from either family 
                                                                                                                      
26 See id. §§ 1101(b)(1), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (providing that “the children, spouses, and 
parents of a citizen of the United States” will be defined as “immediate relatives,” and are 
not subject to numerical limitations imposed upon other family-sponsored immigrants). 
27 See Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, Immigration Fundamentals: A 
Guide to Law and Practice § 3:1.1(4th ed. 2009). 
28 Id. Immediate relatives are not subject to numerical limits on family-based visas is-
sued annually; therefore, this is a highly favored category. Id. 
29 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (“unmarried sons and daughters of citizens”). The 
INA defines “child” as an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(b)(1). “Son” and “daughter” refers to those who do not fall within the definition of 
“child” because they are either married, or over twenty-one years of age, or both. See 
Fragomen & Bell, supra note 27, at 3. 
30 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2). 
31 Id. § 1153(a)(3). 
32 Id. § 1153(a)(4). 
33 See Nat’l Immigration Project, Nat’l Lawyers Guild, Immigration Law and 
Defense § 4:31 (3d ed. 2009). 
34 Fragomen & Bell, supra note 27, § 3:1.1. According to the State Department Visa 
Office, as of January 2009, “pending active family-based preference system cases registered 
with U.S. consulates totaled 2,723,352.” Nat’l Immigration Project, supra note 33, at 
§ 4:31. Family-based fourth preference cases, where a United States citizen applies for his 
or her sibling, account for about forty-five percent of this total (over 1.2 million). Id. As of 
January 2009, Mexico’s family-based preference registrants totaled 961,744, and those 
born in the Philippines totaled 401,849. Id. 
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members or medical professionals.35 The unavailability of a birth cer-
tificate creates a presumption of ineligibility against the beneficiary.36 
Although secondary evidence is acceptable, the credibility and authen-
ticity of such evidence is closely scrutinized.37 In the past, if none of 
these forms of evidence was available, the USCIS would deny the appli-
cation.38 The advent of DNA testing, therefore, offered hope to families 
who did not have these types of documents by offering another avenue 
by which they could prove family relationships.39 DNA testing, however, 
can be used against immigrants.40 For instance, suspicious documents 
will trigger an investigation which may include checking the authentic-
ity of the supporting documents and/or requiring blood tests or “sug-
gested” DNA testing.41 Refusal to take such a test in turn can lead to 
denial of the petition despite the documentary evidence.42 
 Deoxyribonucleic acid is an organic polymer that exists in the cells 
of all living organisms.43 The substance is used to assemble and regulate 
all life forms.44 Each individual (except an identical twin) has unique 
DNA in the nucleus of every cell.45 Accordingly, DNA testing for identi-
                                                                                                                      
35 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(2)(i), 204.2(d)(2)(v) (2009); Alan R. Davis, Comment, Are 
You My Mother? The Scientific and Legal Validity of Conventional Blood Testing and DNA Finger-
printing to Establish Proof of Parentage in Immigration Cases, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 129, 129. 
36 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(i). 
37 See id. § 204.2(d)(2)(v). 
38 See id. § 103.2(b)(8)(1); Davis, supra note 35, at 146. Processing is not routine if the 
documents establishing the relationship are ambiguous. See Fragomen& Bell, supra note 
27, § 12.23. 
39 See Davis, supra note 35, at 146; see also Aytes Memorandum, supra note 4, at 2 (stat-
ing that DNA testing may be used in situations when credible evidence is not sufficient to 
prove a biological relation). 
40 See Swarns, supra note 19. 
41 See Fragomen & Bell, supra note 27, § 12.23. 
42 See id. 
43 Micah A. Luftig & Stephen Richey, DNA and Forensic Science, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 
609, 609 (2001); see Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 24. DNA is “described as a ‘double he-
lix’ —a molecule composed of two twisting strands.” Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 24. 
Each cell contains two identical copies of DNA. See Luftig & Richey, supra, at 609. 
As a carrier of genetic information, its key feature is the ordering of four 
chemical units called “bases” known as adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine 
(C) and guanine (G). The two strands of DNA’s double helix are held to-
gether through the complementary pairing of base A on one strand with T on 
the other, and C on one strand with G on the other. This “complementarity” 
between pairs of bases explains the faithful replication of the DNA molecule 
(and genetic information) from one generation to the next. 
Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 24. 
44 See Luftig & Richey, supra note 43, at 609–10. 
45 See Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 24. 
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fication purposes can be performed on semen, blood, hair and other 
tissues—even by cheek swab at home.46 Early forensic testing was called 
“restriction fragment length polymorphism” (RFLP) where an enzyme 
was used to break DNA into small pieces called “restriction fragments.”47 
This technique analyzes differences within multiple samples.48 Although 
it is still used, its utility is limited because the test requires large amounts 
of non-degraded DNA, a substance which is difficult to find outside of 
the human body.49 Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) or “molecular 
Xeroxing” is a more advanced technique that requires only small DNA 
samples for testing.50 This method uses an enzyme called a “polymerase” 
to produce millions of copies of the initial DNA sequence.51 
 In the immigration context, DNA testing is an emerging industry 
that the government, scientists and laboratories welcome.52 It is ex-
pected to become routine.53 Currently, the USCIS may only suggest 
                                                                                                                      
Each human cell contains about two meters of DNA located in a compart-
ment called the nucleus. Here it is tightly packaged into twenty-three pairs of 
chromosomes, each of which contains a single DNA molecule of, on average, 
roughly 150 million base pairs. The totality of nuclear of DNA in a cell—
which in most people is virtually identical in every cell in the body—is popu-
larly known as a “genome.” 
Id. 
46 See Luftig & Richey, supra note 43, at 611; Press Release, Identigene, Identigene 
DNA Paternity Test Kit Store Sales Rocket Through the New Retail Paradigm for Genetic 
Testing (May 11, 2009) (on file with Identigene Public Relations) (discussing the increase 
in use of over-the-counter DNA paternity test kits at local pharmacies). Identigene DNA 
Paternity Test Kits allegedly became the first kits sold over the counter in March 2008. See 
Press Release, Identigene, supra. These kits permit testing of DNA through a cheek swab 
collected in the privacy on one’s own home. See id. 
47 See Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 25–26. 
48 See id. at 26. 
49 See Luftig & Richey, supra note 43, at 610; see also Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 25–
48 (discussing thoroughly DNA profiling techniques). Exposure to heat, humidity, light 
and the chemicals found at a crime scene leads to decay of DNA samples, making them 
unsuitable for RFLP analysis. See Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 31. 
50 See Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 31 (noting that testing can be done using only “a 
blood spot the size of a large pinhead”); Luftig & Richey, supra note 43, at 610. This tech-
nique, invented by Kary Mullis in 1986, is revolutionizing “not only forensic DNA science, 
but all of molecular biology.” See Luftig & Richey, supra note 43, at 610; see also Cronin 
Memorandum, supra note 4 (acknowledging rapid changes in parentage testing technol-
ogy and recommending the PCR test through buccal (mouth or cheek cavity) swabs in-
stead of drawing blood). 
51 See Lynch et al., supra note 1, at 31. 
52 See Press Release, DNA Diagnostics Ctr., DDC Lab Director Hosts Immigration Work-
shop at International DNA Symposium (Oct. 18, 2007) (on file with author). 
53 See id. A press release from the DNA Diagnostics Center (“DDC”) reporting on the 
pre-Symposium activities of the October 2007 Eighteenth International Symposium on 
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Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) or DNA testing when an applicant 
cannot provide documentary proof of the family relationship through 
labs accredited by the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB).54 
Under current policy, however, USCIS cannot require such testing of 
the applicant.55 
 In light of society’s preoccupation with scientific accuracy, the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) may be pressured to change 
the policy. Other countries currently use DNA testing in family reunifi-
cation cases.56 France statutorily implemented the use of DNA testing 
in 2007, and Switzerland has used DNA testing since 2004.57 Further, 
several other European countries use such tests in family reunification 
cases.58 Even if the current non-mandatory testing policy remains the 
                                                                                                                      
Human Identification where a workshop entitled “Immigration DNA Profiling Issues” was 
sponsored to explore the application of DNA tests to prevent fraud in immigration cases. 
See id. Representatives of the U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, scientists and immigration experts gathered to discuss anticipated changes. See id. Dr. 
Michael Baird of DDC stated “DNA testing for immigration is a rarity right now. However, 
DNA testing is expected to play an integral part in the immigration process in the near 
future.” See id. 
54 Davis, supra note 35, at 132–33. HLA is a tissue-typing test developed to determine if 
an organ transplant recipient will accept or reject the donated organ. Id. at 132. Because 
HLA antigens are inherited, it is possible to use the test to determine parentage with a 
high degree of certainty. Id. at 132−33. “The process is accurate, reliable and scientifically 
and legally valid; therefore, the State Department should encourage and facilitate the use 
of DNA fingerprinting to determine the parentage of naturalized United States citizens 
who are seeking visas for their families.” Id. at 146. Johnny, a Chinese refugee from Viet-
nam escaped with his uncle and younger brother to a refugee camp in Hong Kong. Id. at 
130. The uncle, to keep the family together, claimed Johnny as his son, and migrated to 
the United States. Id. As an adult Johnny petitioned for his parents in China, but the peti-
tion was denied, until Johnny established the familial relationship with blood grouping 
and DNA tests. Id. at 130−31. 
55 Aytes Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2. For a listing of accredited testers, see 
AABB, AABB Accredited Relationship Testing Facilities, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.aab.org/ 
Content/Accreditation (follow “Relationship (DNA) Testing Laboratories” hyperlink; then 
follow “AABB Accredited Relationship Testing Laboratories” hyperlink). There are strin-
gent guidelines to assure that the tests are accurate. Christian M. Rultberg et al., STRBase: 
A Short Tandem Repeat DNA Database for the Human Identity Testing Community, 29 Nucleic 
Acids Res. 320, 320 (2000). The accredited laboratories are permitted to use only the 
polymerase chain reaction-short tandem repeats and the restriction fragment length poly-
morphism (RFLP) methods of DNA testing. Id. at 321. 
56 See Tera Rica Murdock, Note, Whose Child Is This: Genetic Analysis and Family Reunifica-
tion Immigration in France, 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1503, 1529–30 (2008). 
57 See id. at 1529 (citing Doreen Carvajal, French Council Approves DNA Testing for Immigrants, 
Int’l Herald Trib., Nov. 15, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/15/europe/ 
france.php.) 
58 See id. at 1530 (stating that DNA testing for immigration purposes is used in “Ger-
many, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Britain and 
Sweden”). 
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same in the United States, genetic identity will likely be viewed as 
paramount, a reflection of the applicant’s real identity. Moreover, rela-
tionships forged by genetic connections may be seen as superior to 
those established by other unscientific means. 
 In 2007, the New York Times reported that several families willingly 
submitted to DNA tests to prove paternity, only to discover that the citi-
zen petitioner was not biologically related to the beneficiary.59 One 
such family was the Owusu family.60 Mr. Owusu, a U.S. citizen father, 
petitioned to bring his four sons from Ghana to the United States after 
his wife’s death.61 When DHS requested DNA testing to expedite the 
petition, Mr. Owusu and his sons complied willingly.62 When the results 
came back, Mr. Owusu was heartbroken to discover that his eldest son 
was the only boy who was genetically related to him.63 Faced with the 
results of the tests, Mr. Owusu had to choose between abandoning 
three boys he saw as his own sons or fighting to once again reunite his 
family and facing additional immigration hurdles in the process.64 In a 
society structured by social, rather than genetic essentialism, all four 
boys would unquestionably be his sons and would be able to join him in 
the United States without unnecessary delay.65 Instead, his eldest son 
was the only one granted a visa.66 
 If DNA evidence were to be the first line of evidence used in reuni-
fication cases and not merely a last resort as it is now, it could have a 
devastating effect on the purported reunification goal of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.67 By promoting the use of DNA evidence, so-
                                                                                                                      
59 See Swarns, supra note 19. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See Swarns, supra note 19. 
65 Compare id., with LeFevre v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (hold-
ing that though DNA testing was “relevant” in a trusts and estates case to proving paternity, 
paternity must be established “by clear and convincing evidence that the father has openly 
and notoriously held out the child as his own”), and Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1995) (awarding custody to social father rather than biological fa-
ther under the best interest of the child standard in a child custody case, noting “the 
strong social policy in favor of preserving the on-going father and child relationship” and 
that “[t]his social relationship is much more important, to the child at least, than a bio-
logical relationship of actual paternity”). 
66 See Swarns, supra note 19. 
67 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82−414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) 
(emphasizing familial relations). The current Immigration and Nationality Act continues 
this tradition of unifying temporarily divided families by exempting immediate relatives 
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cial interests could become subservient to genetic interests. The bene-
ficiaries could become mere genetic entities, whose genetic relation-
ship is paramount. Familial relationships—like Mr. Owusu’s with his 
four sons—that were forged by years of interaction, care and sacrifice 
could be devastated by one simple test.68 
 In a legal regime where genetic essentialism reigns, Mr. Owusu’s 
three younger children are orphans.69 Without more information about 
their genetic father—or fathers—or any biological connection to Mr. 
Owusu, they lose their immigration priority.70 Mr. Owusu could attempt 
to adopt his own children, under the laws of his former country, and 
then apply to the USCIS to bring them here.71 Ironically, unless he 
adopts his own sons they would be given less priority than a stepchild 
through a second marriage.72 For example, if Mr. Owusu married a 
woman with a son under the age of eighteen, that stepson would be 
given immigration preference over Mr. Owusu’s three sons even though 
each would be equally genetically unrelated to Mr. Owusu.73 
 It is not surprising that the DHS would welcome the use of DNA in 
resolving difficult questions of proof. Immigration law is rife with the 
potential for fraud.74 Science and scientific evidence like DNA testing 
                                                                                                                      
from the family-based quotas. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (defin-
ing children and establishing comprehensive family-based preferences). 
68 See Swarns, supra note 19; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d) (2009) (explaining the test). 
69 See Swarns, supra note 19; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d). 
70 See Swarns, supra note 19; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d). 
71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1); Swarns, supra note 19. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act allows parents to petition for adopted children to become permanent residents of the 
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). The children must be adopted before the age of 
sixteen after having two years legal custody and residence with the adopting parent. Id. 
Naturally, this would add one additional layer of legal entanglement for people like Mr. 
Owusu. See id.; Swarns, supra note 19. He would have to adopt his own child, under Ghana-
ian laws, before that child could join him in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1); 
Swarns, supra note 19. The social stigma, questions and expense that would arise in his 
local community when a father files to adopt a child born in wedlock and presumed to be 
the child of the father, could be daunting. 
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B). 
73 See id. The definition of a child under the Immigration and Nationality Act is an 
unmarried person, under twenty-one years of age and includes a step-child, even if he or 
she is not born in wedlock, as long as the child was under eighteen at the time the step-
parent relationship was created. See id.; see also Palmer v. Reddy, 622 F.2d 463, 463–64 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (discussing the stepchild preference of the INS); In re McMillan, 17 I. & N. Dec. 
605, 606–07 (B.I.A. 1981) (explaining the INS stepchild preference and that “the mere 
fact of a marriage which technically creates a step relationship does not in itself establish a 
stepparent-stepchild relationship for purposes of the immigration laws”). 
74 See Swarns, supra note 19; U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Mi-
gration, Fraud in the Refugee Family Reunification (Priority Three) Program: Fact Sheet, 
Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/prm/ (follow “What We Are Saying” hyperlink; then 
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offer the illusion of certainty and neutrality.75 DNA testing has no po-
litical bias. As such, DNA testing’s scientific neutrality seems to present 
the perfect solution to difficult immigration questions where the po-
tential for errors and fraud is rampant.76 Federal officials understanda-
bly see the certainty and neutrality of genetic testing as an easy way to 
verify that a beneficiary is related to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 
resident.77 
 DNA testing is particularly helpful for beneficiaries emigrating 
from developing and war-torn countries—marriage and birth certifi-
cates may be missing or can be easily forged for a fee.78 For example, 
DNA testing has been used in the admission of refugees.79 Since the 
1980s, the United States has implemented a Refugee Admissions Pro-
gram based on family ties to reunite refugees with their U.S. citizen or 
lawful permanent resident family members.80 In the chaos of the condi-
                                                                                                                      
follow “Fact Sheets” hyperlink; then follow “Fraud in the Refugee Family Reunification 
(Priority Three) Program” hyperlink). 
75 See Jason Borenstein, DNA in the Legal System: The Benefits Are Clear, the Problems Aren’t 
Always, 3 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 847, 848, 853–55 (2006). 
76 See Swarns, supra note 19; U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Mi-
gration, supra note 74. But see Borenstein, supra note 75, at 853–56 (discussing that despite 
the view of DNA as “the epitome of reliable evidence,” DNA can nevertheless become un-
reliable due to human fallibility among other factors). 
77 See Swarns, supra note 19; U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Mi-
gration, supra note 74; see also Borenstein, supra note 75, at 848 (discussing the benefits of 
using DNA evidence). But see Borenstein, supra note 75, at 853–56 (“Even though it may be 
viewed by some as nearly infallible, DNA evidence is susceptible to the same kinds of prob-
lems that afflict other types of evidence.” (citing Adam Liptak, The Nation; You Think DNA 
Evidence Is Foolproof? Try Again, NY Times, Mar. 16, 2003, at D5)). 
78 See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for Female and Child 
Refugees Trapped in a Post-September 11 World, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism 459, 481 (2005); 
Swarns, supra note 19; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Migration, 
supra note 74. 
79 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Migration, supra note 74. 
80 See id. Coordination and management of the Refugee Admissions Program occurs 
through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM). See 
id. The Refugee Admissions Program handles three categories of cases. See id. Priority One 
and Two cases gain access to the program through an individual referral by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a U.S. Embassy or qualified non-governmental 
organization. See id. They may also be designated as qualifying for the program by virtue of 
their need for resettlement. See id. Priority Three (P-3) cases include individuals seeking 
family reunification with certain legal residents in the United States. See id. Reuniting refu-
gees with their family members is a goal of this program, and in the chaos of the condi-
tions that generate refugees, government issued identity documents are frequently un-
available. See Cianciarulo, supra note 78, at 481; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, Migration, supra note 74. The program offers an interesting case study where P-3 
refugees were DNA tested for family reunification purposes. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau 
of Population, Refugees, & Migration, supra note 74. 
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tions that generate refugees, government issued identity documents are 
frequently unavailable.81 In response to reports of fraud, program ad-
ministrators used DNA testing in approximately three thousand refu-
gee cases—primarily with refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia.82 
 In some cases, the DNA test is a welcome relief, an opportunity to 
prove a relationship where no other proof exists.83 In other circum-
stances, however, the test reveals long-hidden and shameful secrets that 
can cut to the core identity of the bewildered and unsuspecting peti-
tioner or beneficiary.84 Stories such as Mr. Owusu’s are not rare. One 
DNA testing expert estimates that in 2004 about fifteen to twenty per-
cent of the 75,000 DNA tests in immigration cases did not produce a 
match.85 Moreover, the government’s growing reliance on DNA testing 
places a financial burden on immigrants.86 In fact, testing of a parent 
or child often costs $450 or more.87 
 When the genetic relationship revealed by DNA testing shows that 
the social relationship between parties does not rest upon a firm genetic 
foundation, those who are disappointed do have alternatives.88 For in-
stance, a U.S. citizen can adopt a child who is under sixteen and bring 
him to the United States.89 When the child is adopted, he will be 
granted automatic citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000.90 
Unfortunately, officials usually do not inform petitioners—even in cases 
where fraud is not suspected—of this and other alternative solutions.91 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Cianciarulo, supra note 78, at 481. Ninety-five percent of the applications of indi-
viduals seeking family reunification with certain legal residents in the United States have 
been African—mainly Somalis, Ethiopians and Liberians. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, & Migration, supra note 74. 
82 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Migration, supra note 74. 
DHS/USCIS and PRM tested a sample of approximately three thousand refugee cases—
primarily Somali and Ethiopians in Nairobi, Kenya and refugees in Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Ghana, Guinea, Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire. See id. The subjects were family members apply-
ing for P-3. See id. The initial DNA testing was not between the applicants and anchor rela-
tives in United States. See id. 
83 See Davis, supra note 35, at 146; Swarns, supra note 19. 
84 See Swarns, supra note 19. 
85 See id. The estimates were made by Mary K. Mount, a DNA testing expert for the 
AABB—formerly known as the American Association of Blood Banks. Id. 
86 See id. 
87 Id. 
88 See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433 (2006). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See Swarns, supra note 19. 
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III. Lessons on DNA Evidence from Other Areas of Law 
A. The Role of DNA in Criminal Law 
 DNA forensics have been widely used since the late 1980s.92 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintains databases of DNA 
from convicted state and federal criminals.93 Even with this experience 
and database, law enforcement officials do not base convictions exclu-
sively on DNA evidence.94 Other evidence, including eyewitness testi-
mony, confessions and alibi evidence are vital parts of the prosecution’s 
case.95 Prosecutors and defense attorneys both caution that DNA evi-
dence may be given undue weight by a jury and trump other more pro-
bative evidence.96 
 Defendants have also challenged the use of DNA evidence at trial as 
potentially violating their constitutional rights.97 For instance, involun-
tary extraction of blood for DNA testing has been challenged under the 
                                                                                                                      
92 See Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the Bar: A 
Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22 Berkeley Tech. 
L.J. 671, 684 (2007) (discussing the history of DNA forensics and the challenges to judges 
as gatekeepers to assess scientific evidence in the aftermath of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc.). 
93 See DNA Identification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131–14134 (1994); Borenstein, supra note 
75, at 858. In 1994, the federal government passed the DNA Identification Act, which au-
thorized the FBI to establish the Combined DNA Index System Program (“CODIS”) data-
base, which has produced matches to identify suspects in many cases, from DNA samples 
from approximately 1.6 million convicted criminals. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14131–14134; Boren-
stein, supra note 75, at 858. All fifty states have legislation mandating that certain classes of 
criminals—for instance, convicted sex offenders—submit biological samples for testing. See 
Moyer & Anway, supra note 92, at 702. 
94 See Borenstein, supra note 75, at 849. Professor Borenstein notes that DNA evidence 
must be assessed along with the probative value of other types of evidence, especially since 
in most felony cases, biological samples are not an integral part of the evidence presented 
to the court. Id. 
95 See id. at 849–50. 
96 See id. at 850. The availability of DNA evidence is such a daunting prospect that it 
has been used deceptively to elicit a confession from the defendant. See State v. Chi-
rokovskcic, 860 A.2d 986, 990–91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (finding a confession 
inadmissible where law enforcement fabricated a lab report to falsely claim that the defen-
dant’s DNA was recovered at the crime scene.); see also Borenstein, supra note 75, at 851 
(“[State v. Chirokovskcic] arguably leaves open the possibility that, in rare circumstances, 
DNA test results could be used in a deceptive manner during interrogating.”). Professor 
Borenstein points out that there are also no consistent standards for determining when 
DNA evidence should be admitted and how much weight should be given to such evi-
dence, especially in the non-match context. Borenstein, supra note 75, at 851–53. Other 
potential problems identified include the standards for testing methods that will be ac-
ceptable in various state courts. Id. at 852–83. Yet, should a defendant be exonerated 
merely because the DNA at the crime scene does not match? See id. at 852. 
97 See Moyer & Anway, supra note 92, at 702–03. 
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Fourth Amendment as an unlawful search and seizure and under the 
Fifth Amendment as a violation of the right against self-incrimination.98 
Appellate courts, however, have rejected Fourth Amendment challenges 
on the ground that the governmental interest in preventing future 
crimes outweighs the prisoner’s lessened expectation of privacy.99 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court found that extraction of blood and its chemi-
cal analysis is not “testimonial or communicative” evidence and there-
fore DNA testing cannot violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.100 Defendants have also argued that involun-
tary extraction of genetic information violates their constitutional right 
to privacy.101 This argument is unlikely to be successful because the Su-
preme Court, in Whalen v. Roe, held that a governmental database con-
taining the names and addresses of prescription drug users did not vio-
late the Constitution.102 
 Moreover, some scholars have expressed concern regarding the 
expanding use of DNA testing in criminal cases.103 DNA was first used in 
cases involving sex offenders and violent felons.104 Now many states have 
expanded their statutes to require DNA collection from individuals con-
victed of a wide range of crimes.105 In the wake of these laws and others, 
some have argued for stricter quality control mechanisms and privacy 
protections as well as a greater consideration of the social, individual 
and legal issues presented by the embrace of this new technology.106 
 The use of DNA testing in the criminal context, however, is very 
different from its use in immigration law. In criminal law, DNA testing 
plays an important role in convicting or exonerating individuals ac-
cused of crimes.107 In immigration law, DNA testing is helpful in prov-
ing or disproving paternity where other sources are unavailable.108 It 
should not, however, be used to separate families where social familial 
ties exist. 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. 
99 See Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing, 
and the Internet, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 965, 1013 (2004); e.g., Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 11 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
100 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762–65 (1966). 
101 See Moyer & Anway, supra note 92, at 702–03. 
102 See 429 U.S. 589, 591, 605–06 (1976); see also Borenstein, supra note 75, at 858–59. 
103 See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 768–72 (1999). 
104 See id. at 773–74. 
105 See id. at 775–77. 
106 See id. at 813–14. 
107 See Borenstein, supra note 75, at 847–48. 
108 See Davis, supra note 35, at 129–31. 
254 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:239 
B. The Role of DNA in Trusts and Estates Law 
 Intestacy law permits family members to inherit a decedent’s es-
tate.109 This legal fiction is meant to approximate a decedent’s desires 
when he fails to execute a will.110 Though intestacy statutes differ some-
what from state to state, all give priority to the decedent’s spouse and 
children.111 
 New York’s Estates Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL), however, per-
mits non-marital children to inherit as well if a DNA test administered 
during the decedent’s lifetime proves paternity.112 Prior New York law 
based on English common law gave no rights to a non-marital child.113 
This law was seen as a punitive measure against the parents’ fornica-
tion.114 Gradually, though, attitudes shifted with respect to “illegiti-
mate” or “bastard” children.115 As such, the common law rule prohibit-
ing illegitimate children from inheriting their parents’ estate was seen 
as unfairly causing these children to suffer for the acts of their par-
ents.116 
 The next logical shift is one where the parent-child relationship— 
and not genetics—is paramount.117 Trusts and estates law scholars ar-
gue that “the existence and nature of the parent-child relationship” 
                                                                                                                      
109 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 2.2 
(1998). 
110 Id. Section 2.2 of the Third Restatement of Property provides: 
 An intestate decedent’s surviving spouse takes a share of the intestate es-
tate as provided by statute. The exact share differs among the states. Not in-
frequently, the spouse takes the entire intestate estate if the decedent leaves 
no surviving descendants or parents and, in some states, if the decedent also 
leaves no other specified relative such as a descendant of a parent. . . . Under 
the Revised Uniform Probate Code, the surviving spouse takes either the en-
tire intestate estate or a specified lump sum plus a specified percentage of the 
excess, if any, depending on what other relatives survive the decedent. 
Id. 
111 See id. 
112 N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 42.1(a)(2)(D) (McKinney 2009). 
113 See Megan Pendleton, Note, Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining a Child’s Right to 
Inherit When Biological and Presumptive Paternity Overlap, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2823, 2828 
(2008) (discussing the history of Lord Mansfield’s Rule and the view that a child born out 
of wedlock was the child of no one and therefore could not inherit). 
114 See id. at 2828−29. 
115 See id. at 2829. 
116 See id. 
117 See Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Advances in DNA Techniques Present Opportunity to Amend 
EPTL to Permit Paternity Testing, 71 N.Y. St. B.J. 34, 34 (1999); Pendelton, supra note 113 at 
2859. 
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should be the “the threshold inquiry” in inheritance cases.118 In fact, 
the Uniform Parentage Act allows judges in paternity suits discretion to 
allow genetic testing in order to establish paternity.119 This discretion 
either to allow or forbid DNA testing allows the judge to base his find-
ing of paternity “on the nature of the parent-child relationship, rather 
than biology or presumptions alone.”120 
 The shift in trusts and estates law toward relying on paternal rela-
tionships and not genetics should also be implemented in the immigra-
tion context. I propose that when a genetic relationship cannot be es-
tablished through documentation, the parent-child relationship should 
allow immigration benefits to accrue. 
 New York Family Court statutes provide that DNA tests can be ad-
mitted into evidence to prove paternity in cases where an illegitimate 
child’s inheritance is disputed.121 Posthumous DNA testing is allowed in 
cases where a child had been born out of wedlock but the decedent 
had “openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own.”122 
 In New York, a child born in a marriage is presumed to be legiti-
mate.123 A non-marital child can inherit if he proves paternity by one of 
four ways: 1) a paternity judgment from a court; 2) an acknowledgment 
signed by the putative father and filed in Albany; 3) a positive match 
between his DNA and DNA of the father taken during the father’s life; 
or 4) clear and convincing evidence of paternity coupled with open 
and notorious acknowledgment of paternity.124 Once a child proves 
open and notorious acknowledgment, New York courts have allowed 
the use of DNA, whether pre or post-mortem, to satisfy the clear and 
convincing evidence prong of the test.125 
 For example, in In re Poldrugovaz, the court allowed the child to use 
posthumous DNA testing to establish clear and convincing evidence of 
paternity because the child provided “some evidence that the decedent 
openly and notoriously acknowledged the non-marital child as his 
                                                                                                                      
118 See Pendleton, supra note 113, at 2859. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 532(a) (McKinney 2009). The establishment of a bona fide par-
ent-child relationship is paramount in my proposal although the EPTL bases such a relation-
ship on the genetic connection. See N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 4−2.1(a)(2)(D). 
122 Anne R. v. Estate of Francis C., 634 N.Y.S.2d 339, 342−43 (Fam. Ct. 1995), aff’d, 651 
N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 1996). 
123 See Nicholas S. Andrews, Note, Atkinson v. Atkinson: Adoption of the Equitable Parent, 
1988 Detroit C.L. Rev. 119, 121. 
124 N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 4−2.1(a)(2). 
125 See id.; Anne R., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 343. 
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own.”126 The court noted that the child must also establish that DNA 
testing “is practicable and reasonable under the circumstances.”127 This 
holding both clarified and lowered the evidentiary requirement New 
York courts had previously used.128 The previous evidentiary standard— 
established in In re Davis—required a child to show clear and convincing 
evidence that the decedent openly and notoriously acknowledged pa-
ternity.129 By lowering the standard of proof so that only some evidence 
of open and notorious acknowledgement is required, the threshold 
question becomes whether the decedent made some kind of open and 
notorious acknowledgement of the child.130 Only after that question is 
answered in the affirmative will the court admit evidence of posthumous 
genetic testing to establish paternity.131 As a result, the parent’s open 
and notorious acknowledgement of paternity takes precedence over and 
becomes more important than the results of the genetic tests.132 
                                                                                                                      
126 851 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255 (App. Div. 2008). 
127 Id. at 263. The Appellate Division, Second Department clarified its holding in Mat-
ter of Davis. Id. at 257–58. In light of Poldrugovaz, the Appellate Division remitted Matter of 
Davis to the Surrogate’s Court. See In re Davis, 869 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100–01 (App. Div. 2008). 
128 See Poldrugovaz, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
129 See In re Davis, 812 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546–47. (App. Div. 2006). Professor Margaret V. 
Turano, in her commentary in McKinney’s Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law, approves of the 
reasoning of the Appellate Division, Second Department as striking an appropriate bal-
ance in the objectives of the statute: 
The Legislature wanted to protect nonmarital children but not to invite eve-
ryone on earth to offer their DNA for comparison to decedent’s. When a pe-
titioner can prove paternity by DNA that was gathered during a decedent’s 
lifetime, the balance holds. When the decedent widely acknowledged the 
child as his own, it is appropriate to use any DNA available (whether from 
blood or tissue and even if gathered posthumously), to make the proof re-
quired by subparagraph (A)(2)(C). Without open and notorious acknowl-
edgement, however, to permit proof by posthumously-obtained DNA would 
be like inviting the whole hopeful world to jump into the fray. 
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 4-1.2, supp. cmt. (McKinney 2006). The Court in Poldrugovaz 
cites, with approval, Professor Turano’s commentary. See 851 N.Y.S.2d at 258. 
130 See Poldrugovaz, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 258. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. In Poldrugovaz, the petitioner submitted: the report of the medical examiner; 
her own affidavit attesting to, among other things, her resemblance to the decedent and a 
meeting she had with the decedent at which, she contends, the decedent acknowledged in 
the presence of another person that she was his child; individual photographs of the dece-
dent and the petitioner which, she contends, evince their like and familial features; and 
the affidavits of several other acquaintances of the decedent who attest that the decedent 
openly acknowledged that he was the petitioner’s father. See id. at 256. The court found 
this was sufficient evidence of open and notorious acknowledgement to warrant posthu-
mous DNA testing. See id. at 264–65. 
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 Some courts have even ignored DNA test results in favor of evi-
dence of a social bond between parent and child.133 In Le Fevre v. Sulli-
van, the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia disregarded DNA test results conducted prior to the putative fa-
ther’s death.134 The court reasoned that DNA evidence could not be 
admitted because under the Social Security Act an illegitimate child 
could only be recognized as the child of the putative father if the father 
had acknowledged that the child was his in writing.135 The court also 
noted that the child could prove entitlement to the decedent’s estate if 
she could establish entitlement under California’s intestacy laws.136 
 The child did not bring forth any evidence to prove that paternity 
was presumed under California law.137 Moreover, the court upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge’s decision that California law did not allow 
“DNA testing . . . . to provide presumptive proof of parentage.138 In-
stead, the court acknowledged that DNA testing—though “relevant” to 
the question of paternity—was not sufficient to establish paternity un-
der California law.139 Rather, paternity must be established “by clear 
and convincing evidence that the father has openly and notoriously 
held out the child as his own.”140 
 Although some courts have held that paternity should not be de-
cided on the basis of DNA testing alone, some scholars argue that intes-
tate succession should rely more heavily on DNA testing.141 For in-
stance, Beckstrom proposes to solve the difficulty of intestate succession 
by relying on genetics.142 He proposes that a decedent’s assets should 
be given to individuals most able to perpetuate the decedent’s genes.143 
Empirical evidence—such as actual wills and surveys of individuals— 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Le Fevre v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
134 See id. In Le Fevre, a daughter born out of wedlock applied for insurance benefits 
under the Social Security Act. See id. at 1403. Although she presented DNA test results as 
evidence, the court held that those test were not sufficient to meet the “openly held out” 
standard required under the Social Security Act. See id. at 1407. 
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)–(3) (2006); Le Fevre, 785 F. Supp. at 1405. 
136 Le Fevre, 785 F. Supp. at 1405. 
137 Id. at 1405–06. 
138 Id. at 1406–07. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. at 1407. 
141 See, e.g., Le Fevre, 785 F. Supp. at 1406–07; Cooper, supra note 117, at 34–35. 
142 See John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and the Law: The Biology of Altruism 
in the Courtroom of the Future 15 (1985). 
143 See id. at 14–15. 
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suggest that when given a choice, genetics is not always at the forefront 
of the testators’ wishes.144 
 This standard of whether the father had “openly held out” the 
child as his own is a standard that could be employed in the immigra-
tion context when faced with questions of disputed paternity and there 
is no DNA match. Open and notorious acknowledgment of the child is 
a reliable indication of the father’s intent not only in trusts and estates, 
but also in immigration cases involving DNA.145 
C. The Role of DNA in Family Law Models 
1. The Best Interest of the Child Standard 
 A paramount goal in both immigration and family law is family re-
unification.146 In the latter field, the family as a social structure is the 
source of proper care and education of children and the optimal means 
of providing for the physical and emotional needs of each member.147 
In English common law, this philosophy contributed towards keeping 
marriages intact.148 Under Lord Mansfield’s Rule, husbands could not 
deny paternity of a child born to their wives during the marriage.149 If a 
child was born during a marriage, his actual paternity was inferior to the 
presumed paternity of the husband.150 A woman could not deny the fa-
therhood of a man whom she had allowed to act as the father of her 
child.151 
                                                                                                                      
144 See id. at 15, 17, 51–53. 
145 See Pendleton, supra note 113, at 2827, 2859. 
146 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 4, at 321–22; supra note 22 and accompanying 
text. 
147 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 4, at 321. 
148 See id. at 321–22. 
149 Id.; see Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B.); see also Andrews, supra 
note 123, at 119–20 (explaining Lord Mansfield’s Rule). Lord Mansfield’s Rule was over-
turned two hundred years later by the Michigan Supreme Court in Serafin v. Serafin. An-
drews, supra note 123, at 120; see also Serafin v. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Mich. 1977) 
(“Neither is the peace of general society fostered by continued adherence to Lord Mans-
field’s rule.”). There, the court ruled that since the adverse consequences of illegitimacy 
no longer applied, the policy considerations favored a change in the rule but left intact the 
presumption of legitimacy, which can be rebutted by evidence that the husband is not the 
child’s biological father. Serafin, 258 N.W.2d at 462–63. 
150 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 4, at 321–22; Pendleton, supra note 113, at 2859; 
Brenda J. Runner, Note, Protecting a Husband’s Parental Rights When His Wife Disputes the 
Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 115, 115–16 (1989–90). 
151 See Goodright, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1258; Runner, supra note 150, at 115–16; N.Y. Jud. Ct. 
Acts Law § 532 & cmt (McKinney 2009). 
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 Family law today still values the social relationship between chil-
dren and fathers because it helps maintain the stability of the family 
and the society.152 Even when the public policy underpinnings of Lord 
Mansfield’s rule lost their force, the presumption of paternity re-
mained.153 Although this presumption could be rebutted with blood 
tests and, eventually, DNA evidence, the law still recognized concepts 
such as equitable adoption and estoppel as exceptions that would pre-
vent a husband denying his duty to support the non-biological child.154 
 Mandatory use of DNA in immigration law would place the pre-
eminence of the family in jeopardy by replacing social relationships 
with genetic relationships. In the immigration context, the results can 
be particularly devastating because the parties are frequently separated 
by many miles and maintaining the social relationship is challenging. 
2. Genetic Essentialism 
 Genetic essentialism or biological determinism is the belief that 
the sum and substance of each of us is our DNA.155 Professor Bender 
argues that although Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World did not use 
the term “genetic essentialism,” he “was satirizing and warning against” 
a world in which genetics “defines our family and our history and pre-
dicts our futures.”156 
 Scientists have allied with government to promote genetic essential-
ism.157 Scholars such as Mary R. Andrlik and Mark A. Rothstein present 
three different arguments to support their view that federal welfare pol-
icy has influenced the prevalence of identity testing.158 First, they point 
specifically to statutes such as the Family Support Act of 1988, the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the Personal Responsibil-
                                                                                                                      
152 See Pendleton, supra note 113, at 2829. 
153 Andrews, supra note 123, at 119–20. 
154 See Pendleton, supra note 113, at 2823. 
155 See Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Arts, Mistakes, 
Sex, Race and Law, 12 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 40 (2003) (citing Dorothy Nelkin & M. 
Susan Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The Gene As A Cultural Icon (1995) and Ruth 
Hubbard & Elijah Wald, Exploding the Gene Myth (1993)); see also Dreyfuss & Nel-
kin, supra note 4, at 316–21 (explaining the concept of genetic essentialism). 
156 See Bender, supra note 155, at 41 (citing Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (First 
Perennial Classics ed., Harper Collins 1998) (1932)). 
157 See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of 
the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 Am. J.L. & Med. 215, 217–18 (2002). 
158 See id. 
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ity and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, which helped to grow the com-
mercial identity-testing industry.159 
 Second, Anderlick and Rothstein argue that the focus on genetic 
testing has firmly established the concept that biological or genetic re-
lationship and parental status are entwined.160 They note that since ge-
netic essentialism has become part of the “cultural atmosphere” it has 
become “easy to slide into the view that [DNA] is the essence of father-
hood.”161 They further argue that this reliance on DNA testing could be 
used to argue that the absence of a genetic match could be used to 
terminate a parent’s duty of support.162 
 Their third argument supports the cynical view that it is “all about 
the money.”163 Government promotion of testing, they contend, is de-
signed to increase financial support by parents and thereby reduce 
public spending on child welfare programs.164 Some members of the 
fathers’ rights movement complain that “DNA testing stacks the deck 
against them—a positive DNA test will establish support obligations, 
but a negative test will not eliminate such obligations.”165 
 Other scholars have proposed that the “intent” and “conduct” of 
the parties rather than biology or marriage should be the determining 
factor of a legal family.166 These arguments have been reflected in court 
decisions. For instance, in Steven W. v. Matthew S., the California Su-
preme Court decided a complex parental rights case by looking pri-
marily to the social bonds between child and parent.167 At issue in that 
case was whether a boy, Michael, was to be raised by either Steven, the 
                                                                                                                      
159 See id. at 218 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103,110 Stat. 2105, 2110–11 (1996) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 601 (2006)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-06, 
§ 13721, 107 Stat. 312, 658 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (2006)); Family Support Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, 102 Stat. 2443 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.)). 
160 See id. 
161 Id. 
162 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 157, at 218. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. at 219. 
166 See Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative 
Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y 
& L. 379, 381 (2007) (discussing a variety of scenarios where the traditional rules are in-
adequate—for example, surrogacy, same sex parents, etc. and public policy dictates a more 
expansive view of parenthood). 
167 See Steven W. v. Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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man who raised him, or Matthew, his biological father.168 Upon Mi-
chael’s birth, Steven had assumed the role of father, until blood tests 
revealed that Matthew was the biological father.169 In the ensuing cus-
tody and visitation dispute, the court held that in the best interests of 
the child, Michael’s social relationship with Steven trumped the bio-
logical one with Matthew.170 The court explained that: 
 [I]n the case of an older child [over two years of age] the 
familial relationship between the child and the man purport-
ing to be the child’s father is considerably more palpable than 
the biological relationship of actual paternity. A man who has 
lived with a child, treating it as his son or daughter, has devel-
oped a relationship with the child that should not be lightly 
dissolved. . . . This social relationship is much more impor-
tant, to the child at least, than a biological relationship of ac-
tual paternity.171 
 The court also noted that Steven “developed the enduring father-
child relationship with Michael” by “openly [holding] Michael out as 
his son to his family, to the school, to the world.”172 The court ex-
plained that Steven had “signed the birth certificate, gave Michael his 
surname, and participated in all aspects of his emotional and financial 
support for the first four years of the child’s life.”173 Finally, the court 
cited “the strong social policy in favor of preserving the on-going father 
and child relationship” when it upheld Steven’s right to custody and 
visitation.174 
                                                                                                                      
168 See id. at 536–37. Julie, the biological mother, lived with Steven, but maintained a 
secret, sexual relationship with her husband, Matthew. Id. 
169 See id. at 537. 
170 See id. at 539. 
171 See id. (alteration in original) (citing Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 120, 124 
(Ct. App. 1994); see also Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 519 (applying equitable parenthood the-
ory to find, over the objection of the mother, in favor of a husband who was not genetically 
related to a marital child). In Atkinson v. Atkinson, the Court found that a husband who is 
not the biological parent of a child may be the legal parent of the child where (1) the hus-
band and child acknowledge a relationship as father and child, or where such a relation-
ship was fostered by the mother of the child prior to the filing of divorce, (2) the husband 
wants parental rights, and (3) the husband is willing to pay child support. See 408 N.W.2d 
at 519. 
172 See Steven W., 39 Cal Rptr. 2d at 539. 
173 Id. 
174 Id.; see also Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 519–20 (adopting an “equitable parent” doctrine 
based upon the best interests of the child to give custody of child to non-biological father); 
Andrews, supra note 123, at 130–32 (recognizing the importance of Atkinson in the devel-
opment of equitable adoption, in the elevation the psychological well-being of the child, 
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 Professor Jacobs argues that paternity laws should recognize a 
child’s right to have a relationship with both a biological and a social 
father.175 She observes that “biological fatherhood has been subordi-
nated to social fatherhood to preserve an intact familial relationship”176 
She notes, however, that “biological fatherhood has served as the sole 
means to establish the legal benefits and obligations of paternity.”177 
She advocates the abandonment of the traditional two-parent paradigm 
in favor of a multiple parent model.178 Moreover, she challenges courts 
to recognize a social father’s right to share, with the biological father, 
the responsibilities and benefits of fatherhood—thereby “protect[ing] 
the institution of parenthood and acknowledge[ing] that parentage is 
defined by much more than DNA.”179 
 The American Law Institute recognizes parents by estoppel and de 
facto parents.180 Equitable adoption and virtual adoption may also es-
tablish paternity despite the lack of a genetic relationship.181 These 
                                                                                                                      
and in the placement of women on equal footing with a man by allowing a woman to sub-
mit a blood test as proof of non-paternity); Christi Gill Baunach, Note, The Role of Equitable 
Adoption in a Mistaken Baby Switch, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 501, 508–13 (1992–93) (dis-
cussing the implications of the “best interests of the child” policy behind Atkinson’s “equi-
table parent” doctrine on mistaken baby situations). 
175 See Melanie P. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 
Ariz. St. L.J. 809, 855 (2006). 
176 See id. at 810–11. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. at 811. 
179 See id. at 813–14. 
180 Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 2.03(1) (2000). 
181 See Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cultural 
Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223, 225 (2008). Equitable 
adoption is also called putative or constructive adoption and is recognized as an inherent 
power of the court, in the best interests of the child, in adoption cases. See id. at 256–57; see 
also Karl A.W. DeMarce, Note, Stepparent Adoption and Involuntary Termination of Parental 
Rights: When Petitioners Come to Court with Unclean Hands, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 995, 1014–16 
(1996) (“It has been maintained that adoption is an equitable power based on the ‘long-
standing equitable power under which children may be removed from the custody of their 
parents under the doctrine of parens patriae.’” (quoting Helen Simpson, The Unfit Parent: 
Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. Det. 
L.J. 347, 353 (1962))); James R. Robinson, Comment, Untangling the “Loose Threads”: Equi-
table Adoption, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrangements, 48 
Emory L.J. 943, 955 (1999) (“Equitable adoption, also called adoption by estoppel, virtual 
adoption, de facto adoption, or specific performance of a contract to adopt, is a nonstatu-
tory remedy fashioned by courts to avoid what is perceived as an inequitable or unjust 
result of strict application of the intestacy statute.” (citation omitted)). Some courts have 
limited the doctrine. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who 
Should Get What and Why, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 711, 780–84 (1984); Elizabeth A. Gaudio, Com-
ment, Limiting the Scope of Equitable Adoption, the Maryland Survey: 1993–1994: Recent Deci-
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doctrines allow a court to decree that a parent has adopted a child if 
the parent makes certain promises or acts in a manner that creates a 
responsibility on the part of the parent even if there is no court order 
or formal legal contract between the parent and child.182 If, for exam-
ple, an adult took a child into his home for an extended period of time 
and then denied parentage, equity would hold the parent responsible 
for the child’s welfare, as if the child had been formally legally 
adopted.183 Adoption by estoppel is similar, and has most often been 
invoked when a parent dies without a will and a minor child whom she 
supported makes a claim on the estate based on the doctrines of equi-
table adoption or equitable estoppel.184 It is possible for a child to make 
this claim even when the child is not named in the parent’s will.185 
 The Revised Uniform Parentage Act provides obstacles to chal-
lenging the paternity of a child with a presumed father.186 This federal 
law requires that, in the best interests of the child, a proceeding to ad-
judicate parentage may only be commenced within two years after 
birth.187 Moreover, it allows a court to deny a request for genetic testing 
if (1) the conduct of the mother or presumed father estopps that party 
from denying parentage; and (2) disproving the relationship would be 
“inequitable.”188 The Revised Uniform Parentage Act therefore ac-
                                                                                                                      
sions: The Maryland Court of Appeals, 54 Md. L. Rev. 822, 822 (1995). For a discussion of 
virtual adoption, see Rebecca C. Bell, Virtual Adoption: The Difficulty of Creating an Exception 
to the Statutory Scheme, 29 Stetson L. Rev. 415 (1999), which explores the history of virtual 
adoption, examines the underlying contractual and estoppel theories that address when a 
foster parent dies intestate after agreeing to legally adopt but failing to finalize the adop-
tion, and concludes that a constructive trust is an effective alternative to the estoppel and 
contractual theories. 
182 See Rein, supra note 181, at 767. 
183 See id. at 766–67. 
184 See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption § 60 (2004); Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Modern 
Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel, 122 A.L.R. 205, 205, 230 (5th ed. 
2004). 
185 See First Nat’l Bank v. Phillips, 344 S.E.2d 201, 205 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that if 
equitable adoption were established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, even when 
there is an intestate death, an equitably adopted child could inherit as the sister of another 
child of the adoptive parent). 
186 See Unif. Parentage Act, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 297–98 (2002). The federal 
incursion into the paternity arena in 1973 established a civil scheme for establishing par-
entage for non-marital children in an effort to ensure that these children have two parents 
providing financial and emotional support. See id. 
187 See id. § 607(a) at 341. 
188See id. § 608(a) at 341–43; Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 157, at 227. The concept 
of “parent by estoppel” contemplates a man who believed in good faith that he was the 
child’s father, lived with the child and accepted responsibilities of parenthood for at least 
two years, and is therefore estopped to deny parental obligation. See Am. Law. Inst., supra 
note 180, § 2.03(1)(b). 
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knowledges the importance of a social-parental relationship that is 
more important than the genetic relationship in the best interest of a 
child over two-years old.189 
IV. Potential Problems 
A. Quality Control of Samples 
 In the criminal context, questions concerning DNA testing proce-
dures reflect unresolved disputes in the scientific community.190 These 
concerns should also give us pause in the immigration context, espe-
cially because USCIS relies on testing of family members in foreign 
countries.191 Although the immigration regulations require that peti-
tioners and beneficiaries seek the services of an American Association 
of Blood Banks (AABB) approved genetics lab, the laboratory tech-
niques at even these labs may not be as sophisticated as those in the 
United States.192 There are, however, strict policies regarding collection 
and chain-of-custody of the samples.193 
 The integrity, competency and fallibility of the technicians, and 
the handling and labeling of samples in the United States and in the 
foreign country become crucial in immigration cases.194 For instance, if 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Unif. Parentage Act § 608(a) at 341–43. 
190 See Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 157, at 225; Borenstein, supra note 75, at 851–
55. 
191 See Cronin Memorandum, supra note 4. 
192 See Aytes Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
193 See U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, DNA and Parentage Blood Testing, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/info/info_1337.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010). 
The manual states: “[u]nder no circumstance should any other party, including those being 
tested, be permitted to carry or transport blood or tissue samples or test results.” Id. 
194 See Borenstein, supra note 75, at 855–56; Cronin Memorandum, supra note 4. Dr. 
Robert E. Wenk, director of an AABB-accredited lab that performs DNA tests for U.S. im-
migration, recently uncovered a new type of fraud. E-mail from Dr. Robert E. Wenk, Direc-
tor, BRT Laboratories, to author ( Jan. 6, 2010, 11:02 A.M. EST) (on file with author). Dr. 
Wenk found: 
[There have been instances] in which close blood relatives of a petitioner (or 
the petitioner himself/herself) substitute their blood samples for those of 
beneficiaries who are unrelated to the petitioner but pretend to be. Corrupt 
blood collectors in one West African nation engaged in systematically substi-
tuting the blood samples in over 3% of alleged families emigrating from that 
nation. When examined by an unsuspecting lab, the DNA profiles of the 
blood falsely demonstrate a relationship, enabling the non-relative beneficiar-
ies (impostors) to immigrate. Since the substituted blood samples often are 
actually those of the petitioner's relatives who already immigrated to the U.S., 
the DNA profile of the relative and the one reused by the impostor are iden-
tical so that I termed this kind of DNA identity theft "genotype recycling". My 
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the technicians improperly collect or store the samples, they could be-
come contaminated and the results would be useless.195 Consequently, 
adequate provisions for the storage of the DNA collected by these pri-
vate companies is imperative. 
B. Privacy Interests 
 Our legal system provides that there is a privacy interest in medical 
information and financial records that requires an affirmative waiver of 
those rights before the information can be released.196 Yet there appear 
to be no safeguards on the use of DNA information once it is submitted 
to DHS.197 For instance, it is unclear if relatives of individuals whose 
DNA is stored can also be tracked using that information.198 If mito-
chondrial DNA is stored, rather than nucleic DNA, the siblings of the 
owner of the banked DNA could potentially be identified because all of 
a woman’s offspring have the same mitochondrial DNA sequence.199 
There is a genuine concern that this DNA, once entered in the data-
                                                                                                                      
detailed findings of the systemic fraud will be published in the Journal of Fo-
rensic Sciences (March 2011). In searching my lab's data of emigrants from 
other nations, I found non-systematic (single cases) of the same fraud. I plan 
to publish these "sporadic genotype recycling" cases of fraud, as well. As a re-
sult of reporting my findings to the fraud unit of the State Dept., all overseas 
sample collection procedures have been changed. Buccal (cheek) swabs are 
collected now instead of blood. Now, there is very strict oversight of sample 
collectors and sample labeling, packaging and shipping by cleared embassy 
officers. In addition, a lab (based in the U.S.) can detect genotype recycling 
as a quality control procedure by searching for identical DNA profiles in its 
database. Finally, the U.S. plans to establish its own database of DNA-tested 
immigrants that will allow electronic searches for reused DNA profiles. With a 
common database, a petitioner will be unable to use more than one lab to 
avoid fraud detection. 
Id. 
195 See Borenstein, supra note 75, at 855–56. 
196 See Julie A. Braun et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 
487, 526 (2000); Hibbert, supra note 103, at 784–85. 
197 See Hibbert, supra note 103, at 786–87; Swarns, supra note 19. 
198 See Hibbert, supra note 103, at 786–87. 
199 See id. at 783–84 (describing the arrest and conviction for rape of the brother of an 
individual whose DNA was banked, because the DNA was so similar that the laboratory 
suggested that the DNA might belong to the relative, and questioning the ethical and legal 
legitimacy of this practice of genomic intrusion by asking whether a sibling loses “privacy 
expectations of being free of searches merely because he is related to an offender”); see 
also Frederick R. Bieber, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberty, 34 J.L. Med & Ethics 222, 226 
(2006) (relating several examples where analyzing DNA of family members has been used 
to identify suspects, leading to arrests and confessions). 
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bank, could be used against the immigrant and his relatives by law en-
forcement. 
 Over thirty years ago, Justice William Brennan identified potential 
privacy hazards in storing medical information in computer data-
bases.200 He noted that the “central storage and easy accessibility of 
computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that infor-
mation, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not 
demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”201 Aside 
from this general predicament, genetic information stored in govern-
mental or private databases has even greater potential for abuse and 
privacy infractions.202 
 Nevertheless, for undocumented immigrants, courts have denied 
the expectation of privacy.203 Likewise, in February 2007 the Depart-
ment of Justice departed from its prior policy that only convicted felons 
were required to provide DNA evidence.204 The Department supple-
mented its prior mandate with one to collect DNA from arrested un-
documented workers and thereby expanded its governmental powers.205 
 Information is timeless; yet, DNA tests can provide information 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.206 This predicament can pose 
problems for petitioners, beneficiaries and their relatives identifiable by 
the DNA. Accordingly, procedures must be instituted for the samples 
and/or results to be discarded so that they cannot be used again for 
other purposes. 
C. Grounds of Inadmissibility 
 The INA provides that aliens seeking to enter the United States as 
permanent residents or on a temporary basis as non-immigrants may 
be deemed inadmissible based on health concerns such as “communi-
cable disease of public health significance,” physical or mental disor-
                                                                                                                      
200 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Hibbert, su-
pra note 103, at 819. 
201 Whalen, 429 U.S at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
202 See Moyer & Anway, supra note 92, at 706–07, 714 (discussing federal and state legis-
lation governing the use of genetic information and predicting that “as early judicial deci-
sions shaped the future of DNA forensics, so too will early decisions shape the future of 
genetic engineering and genetic privacy”). 
203 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
204 Julia Preston, U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 
2007, at A1. 
205 See id. 
206 See U.S. Const. amend. IV.; Preston, supra note 205 (discussing the potential of 
DNA profiles to reveal intimate information). 
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ders, or as persons determined to be drug abusers or addicts.207 Conse-
quently, government access to health information hidden in DNA may 
be damaging to a beneficiary. In addition, information from these tests 
may make a petitioner or beneficiary unattractive to insurance compa-
nies or employers. Thus, discrimination in hiring or in obtaining health 
or life insurance could ensue if these tests reveal a potential for future 
health problems. 
 The INA provides inadmissibility on such health grounds and fur-
ther creates a catch-all category making inadmissible those “likely at 
any time to become a public charge.”208 If there are no clear limits on 
the use of the DNA information collected from petitioners and benefi-
ciaries, this “public charge” category could be used to deny entrance 
based on present or future health risks. For example, if the DNA test 
shows that the beneficiary carries the gene for breast cancer, the results 
could be used to deny admission.209 Similarly, HIV positive individuals 
may be denied admission because the potential cost of health care for 
someone who develops AIDS is staggering and would undoubtedly im-
plicate a “public charge” concern.210 
 The routine collection and storage of this DNA material, given 
voluntarily, for an important purpose, could devolve into a means of 
keeping a check on potential criminal immigrants in an anti-immigrant 
environment. Although this might seem far-fetched, it is no more unbe-
lievable than former New York Mayor and presidential candidate Ru-
dolph Giuliani’s suggestion that the New York legislature seek to collect 
DNA samples from each newborn for the state databank.211 Guiliani’s 
                                                                                                                      
207 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i), (iii), (iv) (2006). 
208 Id. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i), (iii), (iv), (a)(4)(A). The totality of the circumstances ap-
proach was used by the INS in determining who is likely to become a public charge in-
cludes (I) age; (II) health; (III) family status; (IV) assets, resources and financial status; 
and (V) education and skills. Id. § 1182(a)(4)(B)(i). Fortunately a “properly filed, non-
fraudulent I-864” Affidavit of Support, is a legally binding document that is normally suffi-
cient to overcome the public charge ground of inadmissibility. Id. § 1183, 1183(a); State 
Dept. Releases Guidance on Affidavits of Support, 75 Interpreter Releases, June 29, 1998, at 
865, 879. 
209 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A), (B)(II). 
210 See id. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(4)(A). The Department of State recognizes that the 
public charge ground may be appropriate even when a valid affidavit of support is pro-
vided by the petitioner. “Chronic illness, physical or mental handicaps, extreme age or 
other serious conditions” are among the conditions identified. See id. § 1182(a)(4)(B) 
(stating that factors and affidavit are only considerations in the decision whether an alien 
is admissible); see also Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 8 C.F.R. § 231a 
(2009). 
211 See David Seifman, Getting DNA Samples at Birth Fine with Rudy, N.Y. Post, Dec. 17, 
1998, at 34. 
268 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:239 
very justification for this measure was to facilitate his or her apprehen-
sion should the child grow up to be a criminal.212 
V. Potential Solutions 
 DNA tests offer administrative convenience and perceived accuracy, 
yet the USCIS should resist any pressures to require the test for all fam-
ily-based applicants. Instead its current policy on the use of such tests 
should be maintained. Specifically, the USCIS should recommend DNA 
tests to prove the biological relationship between the petitioner and 
beneficiary only if a set of documents is questionable or unavailable. In 
many such cases, DNA testing will confirm the relationship and parties 
will be reunited. If the results demonstrate that there is no genetic rela-
tionship, however, a procedure consistent with the legislative intent of 
the INA should be employed.213 In crafting the INA, Congress recog-
nized the importance of reunification of families as a primary goal of 
the statute.214 Indeed, for immigrant families, adjusting to cultural, fi-
nancial, and even language differences, the vital supportive role that a 
family can play cannot be underestimated. Accordingly, the USCIS 
should recognize social fatherhood to allow families to remain intact. 
  Advocates of DNA testing will point out that such tests can elimi-
nate the potential for fraud.215 Yet, it cannot be assumed that should 
DNA show no match, there is necessarily attempted fraud. In fact, as 
Mr. Owusu’s story demonstrates, DNA testing can reveal unexpected 
results for parties with good intentions.216 Furthermore, familial bonds 
can be strong where there is no blood or adoptive relationship.217 
Therefore, the equitable concept of estoppel should be employed to 
permit these families to reunite. 
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 In addition, the government is capable of detecting immigration 
fraud without blindly relying on the results of a DNA test. Several pre-
cautions to discourage fraudulent applications derived from the Immi-
gration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 1986 illustrate this 
truth.218 For example, the Act authorizes granting two-year conditional 
permanent residence for beneficiaries married less than two years and 
then requires a joint filing of a petition (Form I-751) to remove the 
conditional permanent residence status.219 This burden serves to deter 
sham marriages.220 In addition, a marriage is presumed to be fraudu-
lent, and the alien is subject to deportation, if the marriage was entered 
into within two years prior to obtaining lawful permanent residence, is 
judicially annulled, or terminated within two years after the lawful 
permanent resident’s entry in the United States.221 In all subsequent 
deportation proceedings, the alien has the burden of rebutting the 
presumption that she attempted to evade the immigration laws.222 Fi-
nally, the penalties for marriage fraud are substantial—imprisonment 
for up to five years and/or up to a $250,000 fine.223 Likewise, a finding 
of fraud will bar the alien from obtaining permanent residence, even 
through a subsequent marriage to another United States citizen or law-
ful permanent resident that is geniune.224 Given the utility of these 
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mechanisms, in cases of claimed social fatherhood similar penalties 
could be used to discourage fraud. 
 A useful example in the New York district is the Stokes interview, a 
mechanism currently used to discourage marriage fraud.225 The Stokes 
interview is a secondary interview where the USCIS officer separates 
the parties and questions them using questions that a couple living to-
gether should be able to answer.226 To compare their responses, they 
may be asked about their courtship, the marriage ceremony and hon-
eymoon, color of their toothbrushes or sleeping attire.227 Inconsisten-
cies in Stokes interview responses then help the USCIS detect marriage 
fraud.228 Similarly, in family-based cases when the DNA results are in-
conclusive or show no familial relationship and the parties make an 
equitable claim of social fatherhood, procedures like the Stokes inter-
view could be implemented to combat fraud and yet allow for a more 
thorough determination of the case. 
Conclusion 
 More oversight of the DNA testing companies and stronger poli-
cies regarding quality assurance and privacy are necessary before the 
results of such testing are made paramount in family-based immigra-
tion cases. Although the economic efficiency and administrative ease of 
DNA testing may lull us into complacency, the potential for its abuse is 
substantial and, once released, the DNA genie cannot be put back in 
                                                                                                                      
225 See Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Nat’l Immigration 
Project, supra note 33, at § 4:40. Stokes v. INS was a class action in the Immigration and 
Naturalization’s New York district in response to perceived abuses by examiners—
interviews with few due process safeguards and extremely personal questions. See Stokes, 
393 F. Supp. at 27; Nat’l Immigration Project, supra note 33, § 4:40. The Stokes judg-
ment provides for “adjudicatory proceedings” before a “presiding immigration officer” 
with many due process safeguards, including, inter alia: 
  (1) written notice to the parties of their rights, including the right to an attorney; 
  (2) the right to present evidence, including live witnesses, to cross-examine, 
and to rebut adverse evidence; 
  (3) the right to inspect the record of proceedings; 
  (4) the right to subpoena witnesses and documents; 
  (5) verbatim record of the proceeding (done by recording); 
  (6) referral back to the presiding officer for further adjudicatory proceedings 
after an investigation, if any; and 
  (7) a decision based solely on evidence of record. 
Nat’l Immigration Project, supra note 33, § 4:40. 
226 See Nat’l Immigration Project, supra note33, § 4:40. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. 
2010] Use and Misuse of DNA Technology in Immigration Law 271 
the bottle. Therefore, we should proceed with caution. Additionally, 
the legislative intent of the INA is consistent with the movement in fam-
ily law towards the recognition of social fatherhood and the equitable 
concept of estoppel. Consequently, immigration law should accept this 
more expansive view of fatherhood and allow fathers who are not the 
biological parent to sponsor and be sponsored for lawful permanent 
residence. 
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